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November 3, 2014 / compassioninpolitics

The Jedidiah Royal–Economic Decline Equals War Cards

More interesting would be his Master’s Thesis at the University of New South Wales, published a year later. It’s much more well-warranted and dives into the lit base, considering it’s work for a degree. Jedidiah is more concerned with economic globalization and dependence/interdependence than “hurr durr economic decline means GLOBAL THERMONUCLEAR WAR”, eg. he talks more about the effects of interdependence on peace and conflict than economic conditions explicitly. That mean’s he’s a better author for globalization = more or less war. Yet when he does mention economic conditions, he’s usually explicitly ambivalent and careful to mention both sides. It’s titled. “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus”. This would be a good paper to cut b/c it includes two case studies, Russia (1998-1999) and Indonesia (1997-1998). It also discusses hegemonic stability theory and capitalist peace theory, a good place to cut cards from if you want to answer/support Gartzke like ev, or heg prevents conflict authors. Here are some preliminary cards i cut tonight.

TL;DR: royal isnt a econ decline author, he’s a heg + neolib = ? -> conflict author, and you should cut his masters thesis from a year later

Possible cite for it: Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

ECON GROWTH = WAR Cards from Royal ’11

Lateral pressure theory means that as states become wealthier, their military grows, and makes them more likely to use that power

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 3, “Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation,” p. 48-49, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

Our survey here first highlights a Marxist/realist tradition that suggests that as states become wealthier, they will increasingly be likely to translate that wealth into military capacity.  Once the state owns a strong military advantage, it is likely to use it.  Choucri and North (1975) pioneered this argument, known as ‘lateral pressure theory’, as a means of explaining correlation between growth and conflict.  They suggest that ‘the combination of demand and capabilities will create the predisposition to reach beyond national boundaries to satisfy demands’ (Choucri and North 1975, 17).  As such, Choucri and North believe that as a country become individually wealthier, its willingness to undertake foreign military commitments increases simultaneously. 

War chest theory means that wealthier countries focus more on international affairs and gaining control, increasing conflict

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 3, “Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation,” p. 49, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

Realists also find a relationship between economic integration and idiosyncratic risk that results in a greater likelihood of conflict.  Pollins (2008) argues that economic integration leads to a transnational reorganisation of production and accelerates the transitions between ascending and descending powers.  This occurs on a global level with system-wide shifts in the distribution of power, but manifests itself in terms of security conditions primarily at a state level.  As new states gain wealth and power, they begin to look outward.  This ‘war chest’ theory is similar in character and consequence to ‘lateral pressure theory’, though the motivations differ.  According to the former theory, a state becomes more conflict prone because it has the resources to be more successful in military conflict.  According to the latter theory, proclivity towards conflict is due to a perceived requirement to fuel a growing economy. 

USA proves that richer nations are more conflict prone.

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 3, “Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation,” p. 51, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

When applied to the topic of this paper, the main point drawn out by the Choucri and North, Pollins, Organski and Hegre findings is that winners from economic integration are more likely to enter into foreign military disputes.  Pollins and Schweller (1999) look specifically at the experience of the United States from 1790-1993, and found support for this conclusion.  They find that US power has grown in sync with the extent to which it has integrated its economy within the global economy.  This growth, at an individual level, has coincided with increases in US military engagements overseas.  They suggest that ‘diversionary theory’, ‘war chest theory’, and ‘lateral pressure’ theory are all potential reasons for why this has occurred, acknowledging that the underlying rationale which may differ between administrations and global power conditions. While economic growth can be linked with greater incentives to engage militarily, and in some cases has been shown to result in actual use of force, the decision to go to war appears to be more complex.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1997) show that the relationships between capabilities and escalation is nonmonotonic.  That is, a continued increase in capabilities does not necessarily indicate an increase in the occurrence of conflict.

ECON DECLINE = WAR Cards from Royal ’11

Economic decline –> war

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 3, “Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation,” p. 53-54, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

On an idiosyncratic level, crisis can lead to domestic unrest and large population movements, both of which have historically exacerbated cross-border tensions.  Blomberg and Hess find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during period of economic downturn.  They write: If this study is to convince reader and policy makers of anything, it is that the linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing.  Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour.  Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other.  However, the ability of government organizations to stop the spread of internal conflict to external conflict and vice versa by helping to reduce the incidence of recessions may be quite limited.  Economic aid that is to improve a nation’s productive capacity is likely to be difficult to identify and implement in just such circumstances. (Blomberg and Hess 2002, 89) Further, crises often reduce the popularity of a sitting government.  ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity rising from economic decline, sitting governments, particularly in democracies, have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts in order to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect.  Miller (1999) suggests that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support.  Wang (1996) and DeRouen Jr. (1995) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated.  Argentina’s war in the Falkland Islands is an oft-cited example of a diversionary tactic (Boehmer 2007; Oakes 2006).  Similar to the earlier discussion on lateral pressure theory, specialisation may also lead to asymmetric growth between countries, impacting their respective appetites for conflict as growing economies search for new resources to drive future growth.  This particular notion has grown popular among some US commentators sceptical of China’s global search for resources in recent years.  This topic will be explored in later chapters.  

Two examples: Indonesia, Russia

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 7, “Conclusion,” p. 145, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

The final theme that is clearly brought out through the analytical chapters is domestic economic and political conditions. Domestic economic weakness in Indonesia and Russia resulted in political weakness and the removal of standing leaders. For Indonesia, that allowed for the military apparatus to undertake destabilising operations in and around East Timor, bringing Indonesia into confrontation with Australia and other regional neighbours. For Russia, domestic weakness laid the foundation for a diversionary war in Chechnya.

Indonesia proves that economic decline intensifies secessionist conflicts

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 4, ” Indonesia and Russia Case Studies,” p. 63-66, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

By 1998, the Indonesian crash had become a political event as much as an economic event; economic flaws do not hold a sufficient explanation for such a massive meltdown.  Economic and political consequences began to undermine each other and exacerbated the severity of the crisis by orders of magnitude.  The International Labor Organization assessed that from 1996 to 1998 Indonesia’s poverty level rose roughly 65% leaving upwards of 33% of the total population in poverty (Feridhanusetyawan 1999).  The ensuing domestic unrest and political instability began to weaken Suharto’s standing Jakarta.  An official Australian government publication describes the rapidly eroding public confidence:With the economy in tatters, Soeharto was increasingly on shaky ground.  Student protest grew and the middle class was shaken from its complacency.  Demands for major reform became louder.  Unemployment and rising prices provoked attacks on factories and food distribution networks, usually owned and run by ethnic Chinese Indonesians.  Some Muslim activists, including within the military elite, promoted poorly rationalised explanations for the economic crisis that put the blame on Western capitalism and Chinese entrepreneurs.  Confidence continued to erode.  (Parliament of Australia 1999, 15) The increased willingness of Suharto to use force against the bubbling unrest animated the already largely independent armed forces of Indonesia. In May of 1998, snipers shot and killed four students during a peaceful protest at Trisakti University, which led to mass riots and over 1000 deaths in Jakarta (Parliament of Australia 1999). Despite the dire predicament, Suharto continued to resist foreign influence in Indonesia’s economy, most likely due to his close relationships with those who profited from the Suhartoled economic growth program.  However, external pressure from the IMF, the US and Australia overcame his resistance.  As Murphy writes, ‘Suharto had battled against globalization and lost’ (in Kim 2000, 221). It is in this context that B. J. Habibie assumed the Presidency in 1998.  Habibie was viewed sceptically for a variety of reasons.  He had been a close friend and confidante of the disgraced Suharto for some 40 years, he had no economic credentials, his relations with the military were soured by suspicious military procurement through his businesses, and he was generally regarded as eccentric.  The result was that Habibie lacked legitimacy upon entering office.  Without legitimacy, he was unable to manage the basic functions of the Presidency and extend control over its bureaucracies, namely the TNI and its Kopassus special forces element. Upon Habibie’s assumption of the Presidency, the Jakarta Post issued an editorial stating: The greatest hurdle yet facing President Habibie is his own public image… [His] primary task is to establish integrity and credibility of his own and regain public confidence in the government.  Public confidence is crucial for soliciting full co-operation and understanding on the part of the people, who will have to endure many hardships within the next two to three years at least before the nation’s economy, already paralysed, stabilises and recovers.  (Jakarta Post 1998) The structural weaknesses Habibie inherited from Suharto were crippling.  This handicap led to severe mismanagement of domestic uprisings in Aceh and East Timor.  In East Timor, pro-independence elements were sensing weakness in Jakarta and were looking for an opportunity to either negotiate independence or, if necessary, fight for independence.  The weakness of Habibie led to a vacuum that began to be filled by tensions between the pro-independents and the pro-integrationists.  ‘The first months of the Habibie presidency saw politics polarise in East Timor and an unstable situation threatened to spin out of control’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001, 17). Habibie had only two real options for East Timor: either grant it some measure of, if not total, independence, or control it through brutal and repressive methods.  Habibie’s first attempt was for the former, offering ‘special status’ to East Timor and high degree of autonomy, but negotiations could not be completed.  The Australian Government cites the growing costs associated with East Timor management in the wake of the AFC as an influence on Habibie’s eventual decision to grant full independence:Some influence Indonesians began to argue openly that the price paid for East Timor was too high.  At the end of 1998, Indonesia’s economy was still in dire straits and the government ill afford to squander resources or undermine much-needed international support.  (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001, 40) This was also the topic of the 19 December 1998 letter from Australian Prime Minister John Howard to Habibie, in which it is reported that he suggested ‘Indonesia might find itself subsidising East Timor for 10 more years or more, only to be obliged to let it go its own way at the end of that time’ (Bell 2000, 171). Further, growing reliance on outside financial support, particularly by the IMF, constrained Jakarta’s options for how to deal with East Timor, knowing that the support could dry up if Habibie were to sanction the repression of East Timor (Cotton 2004). Jakarta was edging closer and closer to full independence, due at least in part to the succession of events cascading from the financial crisis.  At the same time, rogue elements of the security forces were undertaking unauthorised intimidation tactics, including through supporting proxy militia groups, against pro-independent elements.Habibie announced a new deal for East Timor in January 1999, offering either autonomy under Indonesian rule or full independence for East Timor.  The offer emboldened the proindependents, and escalated the stakes for pro-integrationists.  Bursting tensions meant that violence spiralled out of control leading to full scale guerrilla warfare between TNI and the militia groups it supported, and FALINTIL, the Timorese independence force, culminating in the Liquica and Dili killings of April 1999.  In May 1999, agreements were completed that released East Timor from Indonesian rule and opened the door for the UN Security Council to establish a security and diplomatic foothold to quell violence and establish governance (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001).Since 1999, the UN, led by the Australia military, has been providing peacekeeping troops to East Timor through to the present day.  While it is not fair to say that the East Timor crisis can simply be boiled down to the economics of the AFC – certainly the full story is much more complicated and reflects a broader historical retelling than this paper can provide – the financial crisis was certainly the precipitating event that opened the door for the cascading events between 1997 and 1999 (Napier 1999).Economic instability led to unrest, central government weakness, and constrained options for the management of East Timor.  This led to domestic violence and a security crisis that the UN has been wearing for the past decade.  Systemic risk from integration is directly linked with the East Timor crisis of 1998-1999. 

Economic decline in Russia led to a diversionary war in Chechnya, collapse of US-Russian relations, and Putin’s re-election.

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 4, ” Indonesia and Russia Case Studies,” p. 78-79, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

It is difficult to come to a conclusion that the second war in Chechnya was singularly a result of Putin’s (and Yeltsin’s) political ambitions. Other factors were also in play. However, it is equally clear that Putin saw great political opportunity in the war, and he sought to exploit it as much as possible. It is entirely possible that in better economic and political times, the war in Chechnya may never have occurred. Further, it is unarguable that Putin owes his Presidency, and now Prime Ministership, to the political boost that Chechnya provided. In 2007, former economic adviser to Yeltsin, notes that Putin campaigned on the war in Chechnya in 2000, and then on the confiscation of Yukos in 2004. He writes: It would be natural if he chose a new topic for his third campaign, and one that could justify a state of emergency. Russian television has recently shown how World War II forced Roosevelt to stay on for a third and fourth term because of national emergency. Foreign policy involving military action appears Putin’s most obvious choice, and our worry today should be what ‘national emergency’ Putin may invent. (Åslund 2008, 23) Comments This case study explores the economic-security nexus that played out in Russia during 19989. Russia’s swift and dramatic movement into the global economic system brought with it high levels of systemic and idiosyncratic risk. Systemic risk was associated with procyclical capital flows, market imperfections, and financial crisis contagion. Idiosyncratic risk was associated with specialisation. Risk gave way to consequence in 1998 when Russia announced that it was unable to meet its debt obligations. The collapse of the Russian economy had two primary security impacts. First, Russia felt betrayed by the Western system, which exacerbated imbalances in Russia’s economy, fled when Russia’s economic outlook became suspect, and declined to provide Russia with a sufficient level of crisis lending to prevent a hard landing. As a result, Russia’s foreign policy towards the US and the West became more assertive, relying more on military preparations to resist the vulnerability it had come to feel. A second security impact was the prosecution of a second war in Chechnya as a diversionary strategy to consolidate political support behind the ruling party. Strong incentives created by the 1998 economic crisis clearly impacted Putin’s thrust towards war. It remains uncertain how Russia and its economic and security relations with the West will emerge from the Putin era. Given that ‘the Russian state’s vision of a market economy is different from Western concepts’ (Steinherr 2006, 250), the long term compatibility will be an outstanding issue in coming years, particularly as it appears Russia and the US have both been hit hard by the Global Economic Crisis of 2008-9. 

Russia Example = (Econ decline -> diversionary war in Chechnya)

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 7, “Conclusion,” p. 144, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

A second theme that emerges from the analytical chapters is precisely this idea of future expectations, though I believe Copeland limits himself too much by simply focusing on trade expectations.  Such expectations today are just as important in terms of financial flows as they are in trade flows.  In the Russia case study, Russia’s expectation of future western financing dropped precipitously when procylcical financial flows resulted in a dramatic withdrawal of western capital in 1998.  This led to a Russian calculation that it would be unlikely to rely upon the global economic system to gain security.  This drop in future expectation resulted in a deliberate turn away from warm relations with many western countries and the United States in particular.  Peaceful conditions have yet to return to the pre-1998 level.  Further, I argue that there is a causal connection between the drop in future expectations, the decline of relations with the West, and the initiation and long-term prosecution of war in Chechnya.   

BOTH SIDES/WHAT ROYAL ACTUALLY BELIEVES

He mentions the two biggest opposing theories here, (diversionary theory, econ decline -> war, and war chest/lateral pressure theory, econ growth = war)

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 3, “Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation,” p. 55, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

Conclusion

The literature review indicates a strong bias towards a sceptical view of idiosyncratic risk as a result of economic integration.  The relevant economic theory at this level suggests that economically integrated states are not necessarily individually stable.  Economic instability can lead to political instability and an increase in the likelihood of conflict-inducing behaviour.  This relationship will be explored further in the following chapter.  Further, the decision by political leaders to use force also appears to be linked to relative economic health of the nation.  Here, political science seems to suggest a no-win situation.  Economic growth leads to a greater likelihood for political leaders to use force simply because they can (war chest theory) or to seek out new opportunities to sustain growth (lateral pressure theory).  But economic decline may also increase a political elite’s decision to use force if doing so can cauterize decreasing popularity emanating from the economic decline (diversionary theory). 

He sort of concludes that there is no definitive answer…

Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” From Chapter 7, “Conclusion,” p. 146-147, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw…:10112/SOURCE01

The economic-security nexus debate is far from over. There are no ‘silver bullet’ answers, but instead a variety of threads in this these interwoven relationships. Going forward, the economic-security nexus remains a rich and promising field of both political science and economic study. Further work in this regard could focus on discerning the discrete interactions between the levels of risk, or developing quantitative models that capture the entirety of the broadened framework. As economic structures and technologies propel globalisation in new directions, it is hard to imagine a more important and worthwhile discipline of security studies than the economic-security nexus. 

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