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January 27, 2014 / compassioninpolitics

Answering the Cosmopolitanism Good Critique

Cosmopolitianism Good is basically Neo-liberalism or Capitalism Good

Cosmopolititanism Bad is basically the opposite

Realistically cosmopolitianism is the ideology behind:
1) globalization
2) international law
3) standardization of various national laws (so they sync up better)
4) everything about “the international” versus the local

Some of the Cosmpolitianism bad will be about what it does to the local……and the importance of the universal.

Its critical to ask questions about what they think it is in cross ex….so you can clarify the link to whatever impact turn you are looking to use against it.

———————

These are also possibilities/viabilities:

Nationalism Inev
Perm do the alt
Schmitt
Framework
No Link (may not be the best but it’s definitely winnable)
Floating PIK’s bad?
If they win the link, the aff is an impact turn, you can do a lot of work there.

Possibly state good
———————

Cosmopolitainism destroys distinctions in favor of a ‘liberal’ order that destroys state sovereignty.
Odysseos 07 – * Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex, UK (*Louiza, “The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War, and the Crisis of Global Order” 2007 p. 130-131)

Historically, much of cosmopolitanism’s critique had been directed towards the Westphalian system whose emphasis on state-centricity and sovereignty had arguably prevented the emergence of cosmopolitan law and world peace (see Kant 1991; Linklater 1998). Since 1989, however, a year iconic for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe, a newly revived cosmopolitanism has heralded an ethical and political perspective promoting global inclusivity, based on the claim of a universal humanity. The Cold War had reached its conclusion and the geopolitical imperatives that had mocked such a cosmopolitan perspective as utopian were assumed to have dissipated with the discrediting of statism (in the form of really existing communism) and of ethnic particularisms. Moreover, the nation-state’s control of its economy appeared to be under threat by processes of financial and economic globalisation. This allowed cosmopolitan thought – at once a theoretical outlook, a diagnosis of the ills of the current epoch and a universalist normative perspective (Fine 2003: 451) – to articulate hybrid political alternatives to the international state system, particularly in the form of global liberal governance and cosmopolitan law. The new cosmopolitanism, appealing to both academics and policy-makers, could now be seen as a necessary analytical perspective responding to the demands of this new age and as a political project erasing lines and making porous the boundaries of the exclusionary territorial interstate order. The overcoming of the sovereign nation-state is one of the keystones of cosmopolitan thinking: its centrality in the Westphalian order, as well as its tendency towards war and self-interested behaviour, has been considered one of the main obstacles to greater international cooperation and integration. Liberal cosmopolitanism, therefore, encourages the ‘crossing of the line’ for people, capital, commerce and justice, arguing that ‘[w]e no longer live, if we ever did, in a world of discrete national communities’ (Held 2002: 74). A second tenet of cosmopolitanism is the promotion of the individual. Recognising that globalisation was intimately connected with ‘individualization’, Ulrich Beck proclaimed that we were now living in the ‘second age of modernity’, an age that had at its centre, not the state, but the individual. Beck advanced a view of cosmopolitanism which turns on its head the staples of the pluralist international society. This second ‘cosmopolitan’ stage of modernity, Beck suggests, is distinct from the modern statist order of international law, where ‘international law (and the state) precedes human rights’ (Beck 2000: 83). This cosmopolitan second stage involves the construction of a legal, ethical and political order that properly reflects the centrality of the rights-bearing individual, who is no longer grounded in community and state, but rather that itself grounds a new order, in which ‘human rights precedes international law’ (ibid.) Such a cosmopolitan order seeks the denigration of distinctions, such as ‘war and peace, domestic (policy) and foreign (policy)’ which had supported the Westphalian system (ibid.). This order, moreover, ‘goes over the heads of the collective subjects of international law [states] to give legal status to the individual subjects and justifies their unmediated membership in the association of free and equal world citizens’ (Habermas 1997: 128). It presupposes, in other words, that politics, law and morality ought to converge and be explicitly grounded on ‘a legally binding world society of individuals’ (Beck 2000: 84). Within the contemporary literature it is often acknowledged that there are at least two distinct strands of cosmopolitanism. The first maintains a critical attitude towards some ‘run-away’ or negative processes of globalisation and promotes ‘human rights’ and desirable standards by which global capitalism has to abide (see, for example, Falk 1995). The second strand of cosmopolitanism ‘run[s] parallel to the discourse of globalisation and rhetorically complement[s] it’ (Gowan 2003: 51), being neo-liberal in its ideological orientation. Moreover, it considers the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-intervention as conditional, in that they ‘can be withdrawn should any states fail to meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the requirements of liberal governance’ (ibid.: 52). State sovereignty, in other words, becomes restricted by ‘the simple but uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself’ (Rasch 2003: 141). This neo-liberal cosmopolitanism claims to promote human rights against sovereignty but often betrays an ‘arbitrary attitude towards enforcing of universalist liberal norms of individual rights’ despite its resting on the argument of a humanity that is ‘finally on the verge of being unified in a single, just world order’ (Gowan 2003: 52). While this distinction is partly useful, the two strands of cosmopolitanism tend to reinforce each other and, more importantly, rely heavily on the political discourse of humanity for their justification. This discourse calls forth, and justifies, a (re)ordering of international politics: towards global governance, in the first strand, or as a result of ‘just’, ‘humanitarian’ interventions and other such militarised responses, in the second strand. Next, I examine important concerns articulated about the discourse of humanity before turning to the relationship between cosmopolitanism and the War on Terror.

Cosmopolitan liberalism is not actually more open because it can only be extended to others who have already accepted liberal principles. States that resist the global order are treated as threats.
Brown, 06 (Wendy, Prof Poli Sci, UC Berkeley, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in an Age of Identity and Empire).

Liberal tolerance, which simultaneously affirms the value of autonomy and consecrates state secularism, is understood as a virtue available only to the self regulating individual, as a political principle available only to secular states, and as a good appropriately extended only to individuated subjects and regimes that promote such individuation. Conversely, those captive to organicism and organicist practices are presumed neither to value tolerance, to be capable of tolerance, nor to be entitled to tolerance. The governmentality of tolerance deploys the formal legal autonomy of the subject and the formal secularism of the state as a threshold of the tolerable, marking as intolerable whatever is regarded as a threat to such autonomy and secularism. Yet even as tolerance is mobilized to manage the challenges to this logic posed by the eruptions of subnational identities in liberal polities occasioned by late modern transnational population flows, its invocation also functions as a sign of the breakdown of this logic of liberal universalism. Tolerance arises as a way of negotiating “cultural,” “ethnic,” and “religious” differences that clash with the hegemonic “societal culture” within which they exist. The conflict that emerges when those differences emerge or erupt into public life poses more than a policy problem- for example, whether Muslim girls in France can wear the hijab to public schools, or whether female circumcision or bigamy can be practiced in North America. Rather, the conflict itself exposes the nonuniversal character of liberal legalism and public life: it exposes its cultural dimensions. This expose is managed by tolerance discourse in one of two ways. Either the difference is designated as dangerous in its nonliberalism (hence not tolerable) or as merely religious, ethnic, or cultural (hence not a candidate for a political claim). If it is nonliberal political difference, it is intolerable; and if it is tolerated, it must be privatized, converted into an individually chosen belief or practice with no political bearing. Tolerance thus functions as the supplement to a liberal secularism that cannot sustain itself at this moment.

Cosmopolitanism is the perfect excuse for colonial domination—it cloaks the culturally specific Western liberal subject as a universal neutral.
Brown, 06 (Wendy, Prof Poli Sci, UC Berkeley, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in an Age of Identity and Empire).

The native, the fanatic, the fundamentalist, and the bigot are what must be overcome by the society committed to tolerance; from the perspective of the tolerant, these figures are premodern or at least have not been thoroughly bathed in modernity, a formulation endlessly rehearsed by Thomas Friedman in his New York Times editorials on Islam. This reminds us that it is not really Western civilization tout court but that identifications of modernity and, in particular, liberalism with the West- indeed, the identification of liberalism as the telos of the west- that provides the basis for Western civilizational supremacy. What wraps in a common leaf the native, the fanatic, the fundamentalist, and the bigot- despite the fact that some may be religiously orthodox or members of an organicist society while others may be radical libertarians- is a presumed existence in a narrow, homogenous, unquestioning, and unenlightened universe, an existence that inherently generates hostility towards outsides, toward questioning, toward difference. “Learning tolerance” thus involves divesting oneself of relentless partiality, absolutist identity, and parochial attachments, a process understood as the effect of a larger, more cosmopolitan worldview and not as the privilege of hegemony. It is noteworthy, too, that within this discourse the aim of learning tolerance is not to arrive at equality or solidarity with others but, rather, to learn how to put up with others by weakening one’s own connections to community and claims of identity- that is, by becoming a liberal pluralist and thereby joining those who, according to Michael Ignatieff, an “live and let live” or “love others more by loving ourselves a little less” Tolerance as the overcoming of the putative natural enmity among essentialized differences issues from education and repression, which themselves presume the social contract and the weakening pf nationalist or other communal identifications. Formulated this way, the valuation and practice of tolerance simultaneously confirm the superiority of the West; depoliticize (by recasting as nativist enmity) the effects of domination, colonialism, and cold way deformations of the Second and Third Worlds; and portray those living these effects as in need of the civilizing project of the West.

Note:
and the aff is an impact turn because if they’re winning the plan is nationalist and imposes nationalist identity on global problems (whatever the link is), then you aff is a reason why that’s good via your impacts. just have to write and impact o/v for the K and before it put : If they win a link, then the aff is a reason why nationalism is good because we solve our impacts. This is just a generic way to answer Ks in general.

There are also two Dropbox files here on this question (I believe).
Specifically in post 18.

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