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April 19, 2013 / compassioninpolitics

Does the Latin American economic engagement policy topic require fiat abuse or object fiat abuse

My theory: the resolution is interesting. Because the US is capitalist, the government doesn’t control its businesses behavior directly.

I can’t figure out if you think this is a topicality question or a solvency question. I will answer both claims:

This is hardly an indict of the resolution. There is historical evidence on this question. Economic engagement = X amount of change (economically in millions or billions of dollars).

How much of it will be specific to Latin America and/or the specific type of reform involved may be up for debate (or rather will vary on a case by case basis–based on the nature of literature base).

Second, if you look at the list of the mechanisms–its very specific about the types of impacts the government can have on business policy. I think it will radically shift your opinion on this topic–especially as you read more of the issue on the topic.

Plus, affirmative literature (at least the most specific solvency) will be assumptive of the strengths and limits of those policies. Thats the world they deal in every day. Buchards list unpacks what some of those specific topical mechanisms are which are on face “economic engagement”

Third, US economic engagement happens on multiple levels:
1. The US government makes a change and spends say $50 million or so on goods and services that are used to make the country better. According to some facts from CATO 90% of that is US based (a pre-2000 report on US development aid). Although the percentages aren’t all that important. This part of the policy gives the US direct control.
2. More follow on engagement due to change in policy. Or post the change–the government in the other country has more money to spend.
3. There may be conditions applied. Usually its on our side I would presume, but it may be on the other as well. (with these affs this may be less relevant). it seems like the equivalent of a rider disad sorta. Normal means is X conditions. But these will likely be bunk assertions–for specificity & context specific reasons.

These mechanisms give us direct control over policy.

Plus, businesses don’t like disorder, post the plan, the US establishing a policy probably creates order and stability to a relationship. The nature of capitalist companies is they seek out economic advantages–the change in the political situation & the increase in ties–will likely create less uncertainty & less stability–making US trade more likely.

And even if you prove the resolution has a flaw–in terms of how policy debate typically relates to resolutions, thats not really the Affirmatives fault.

Economic engagement will likely be pretty much on face given the very specific list of policies that are contained in the Stefan Buchard list of areas and engagement mechanisms. Therefore with most affirmatives, the will almost always be mandating a particular policy change thats intrinsically economic in nature.

And here’s evidence from Hillary Clinton from November ’12:


The third major area of focus for economic statecraft is commercial diplomacy that boosts U.S. exports, opens new markets, and levels the playing field for American businesses. Let me hasten to say this is not just about American prosperity. Although, as you might guess, as the American Secretary of State, that ranks very high on my list of priorities. That is always our goal. But this is about finding more opportunities for all of us to prosper together. It’s about helping the next wave of emerging economies achieve the same kind of growth that Singapore has enjoyed. It’s about rebalancing the global economy so Americans export more, Asians import more, and we avoid financial crises and build middle classes.
So, the United States is stepping up our game, using our network of more than 270 embassies and consulates to advocate for American firms, and help achieve President Obama’s goal of doubling U.S. exports in 5 years. With 95 percent of the world’s customers living beyond our own borders, this has become an economic imperative. So our diplomats are working to make it easier for U.S. businesses to find answers and get advice about navigating markets. We’re helping them connect with foreign partners and compete for contracts. And whenever a U.S. Government official travels overseas now, we try to include business events on our schedules. In fact, later today I will visit a General Electric aviation facility here in Singapore.
We are sending more trade missions, like the one I mentioned to Burma. And this summer I led the first delegation of American CEOs to the U.S.-ASEAN Business Forum in Cambodia. Three heads of state and more than a dozen key ministers were eager to engage with them. Back in Washington, we have convened conferences bringing together business leaders and government officials from more than 100 countries. We’re proud to go to bat for the Boeings and Chevrons and General Motors and so many others. But we’re also working to help industries large and small that have not been traditional exporters. Ultimately, this effort is more than hooking a big fish here and there. We want every company — American, Singaporean, or any other — to have that level playing field and a chance to compete on the merits. That is a recipe for shared prosperity.

And more evidence from Hillary Clinton, same cite, source below:

Yet in too many places businesses trying to break into markets face resistance, including trade barriers that are going up not along national borders, but behind them. And these obstacles stem from political choices, not market forces. And it will take serious and sustained diplomacy to address them. Wherever companies face discrimination, the United States will stand up for the rules of an open, free, transparent, and fair economic system, and we expect all like-minded economies to share that responsibility.
Now, recently we saw a break-through when India retooled its policy on foreign direct investment. Their old rules barred companies that carry multiple brands in one store — like Wal-Mart, Target, and Costco, or similar foreign companies — from doing retail business in the Indian market. That limited competition. But, more than that, it prevented the kind of knowledge transfer and supply chain modernization that India needs. So we and — I should note — other countries, as well, raised this issue with India’s leaders at the highest level for years. And we are pleased that Delhi has now agreed to loosen its restrictions.

(Source: )

* I apologize if any of the above is unclear.
** For debaters…you might check my earlier post on this thread regarding this issue. I seem to remember doing a decent job handing it then as now.

I would also point out that this thread attempts to address the issue (my first response is a misunderstanding of what Teja is calling object fiat… second I think answers it and I’m sure others do:

But I think collectively that the question is answered. The USFG has a number of policy levers and they are incentives for action.
1. Those incentives include lowering trade barriers & creating an environment condusive for economic engagement.
2. Also the policy itself
3. There will be predictive economic evidence based on empirical ev. with other countries. The above evidence is the tip of the iceberg.

I can’t stress enough how the specificity issue will also answer it back. This specifies the mechanisms:

* You should bookmark & print out that Buchard article. Its incredibly key to the resolution.


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