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November 30, 2012 / compassioninpolitics

Running policy good framework arguments on the negative against critical and performance teams

This is particularly targeted at affirmatives:
1. claim to protect minorities
2. specifically critique policy debate from a minority perspective (whatever that is…if it even exists beyond the confines of one theorists interpretation of what that means)

Basically your job is to explain why fairness, justice, and the policy rules are key to:
1) protect the debate process & education
2) to protect minorities (turning their case)
3) their K is my ground. their individual advocacy is my ground.
4) they cheated–they shouldn’t win for cheating. they can still be as free as they want–they just shouldn’t win.

Note: not all these arguments will always apply–however given that these are often analytical debates….the time difference won’t generally matter (and you should think that through as much as you can before the debate).

This is mostly just evidence. The following includes 27 pieces of evidence. Sorry, you have to highlight them….and bold the tags.
Some also have commentary….you can do what you want with the commentary–they may help you contextualize the evidence that you wouldn’t otherwise be able to.

“Voices of the Oppressed”/”Insider Viewpoint”/ “Voices at the Bottom of the Well” Turn

Assuming insiders have more knowledge is equally flawed, colonialist & racist.
Scheyvens & Leslie 2000 (Regina Scheyvens, Geography program at School of Global Studies Massey
University, Helen Leslis, School of Nursing Griffith University, Women Studies International Forum, 2000, p. 121)

This viewpoint has also been criticized, however, on the basis that it is excessively romantic to posit that only
indigenous people are competent to speak on social issues affecting their countries (Goodman, 1985), or that
only a women, or personal of color, or a homosexual can carry out justice-inspiring research on, respectively,
other women, people of colour, or homosexuals:

To assume that ‘insiders’ automatically have a more sophisticated and appropriate approach to understanding
social reality in ‘their’ society is to fall into the fallacy of Third Worldism, and a potentially reactionary
relativism (Sidaway, 1992, p. 406).

The Shively evidence (I’ve included 2 pieces) are generally the best I think. Note: at least one of these Shivley cards is probably in your framework shell already.

TURN–Lack of rules of debate and mutual dialog hurts minorities. Deliberation is critical to prevent marginalization and violence — abandoning such argument cements exclusion by ignoring the spectrum of power relationships throughout society
Tonn 5 [Mari Boor, Professor of Communication – University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall] *_*

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102
The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues— models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as “elitist” or “monologic”—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate “in what we call the reality-based community.” Such people “believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality.” Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: “That’s not the way the world really works anymore . . . We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality— judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, “A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its ‘surgical’ proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function.” The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, “is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts.”104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the “heart” of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

TURN: Limits and shared understandings are good and key to discussion, debate, and dialog. Determining framework is a prior question —- only once agreed-upon limits are established can the debate even begin
Ehninger 70 [Douglas, Professor of Speech – U Iowa, Speech Monographs, June, p. 108] *_*

If two friends differ on whether they will gain greater satisfaction from dining at Restaurant A or Restaurant B, because the causes are simple and immedi¬ate, the common end at which they aim-that of maximum enjoyment-will exhibit like qualities. When, on the other hand, as in a dispute concerning political persuasions or social philosophies, the causes are broad and complex, the end aimed at may be remote or abstract. Always, however, some agreed upon end or goal must be present to define and delimit the evaluative ground within which the interchange is to proceed. When such ground is lacking, argument itself, let alone any hope of resolution or agreement, becomes impossible. The absence of a commonly accepted aim or value is what lies at the root of many of the breakdowns that occur, for example, in negotiations between the Communist and Western nations, and what accounts for the well known futility of most disputes on matters of politics or religion. When disputants hold different values their claims pass without touching, just as they pass when different subjects are being discussed. What one party says simply is evaluatively irrelevant to the position of the other. An examination of the nature of ends or values need not concern us here. Perhaps at bottom they are matters of feeling, of personal style or taste. The important point is that they lie on a deeper stratum than argument is capable of penetrating; they are something which argument cannot shape or determine but which it must presuppose-something which any two disputants need to assume and agree upon as a necessary condition of argumentative interchange.

Danger: moderate tension with state bad/anarchy like args, but I think you can make a distinctions.

They leave policy debates & education for insiders. That entrenches the power of the elites in power.
Walt 91 [Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, “International Studies” Quarterly 35]

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning-game theory is an obvious example-we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On thc whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self interested parties.

Voter for fairness and education. Framework is a prerequisite to debate.
Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-182
The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say “no” to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say “yes” to some things. In particular, they must say “yes” to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Rules good: even openness requires limits, rules and closure. Shared conventions form the basis for the possibility of political discussion and participation.
Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 179
To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specifying what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say “no” to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say “no” to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the principles of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand deliberation and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain clear limits, rules, closure. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be retaught and reenforced among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that they require the most unflagging and firm support that we can give them.

Instrumental affirmation of a policy through role-playing is a prerequisite to liberal democratic participation
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 1999, p. 56-57
To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

Warning: this probably has some tension with your K. Its a decent argument.

The relativist cynicism of radical critique paves the way to fascism; framework is necessary to educate ourselves about positively changing the world for the better such that we don’t fall prey to the right-wing totalitarianism at the heart of postmodern critique.
Martin Lewis, Assistant Professor at George Washington, 1992, Green Delusions p. 258
A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. It is actually possible that a radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today’s students may embrace only the new creed’s rejection of the past. Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism’s contempt for established social and political philosophy—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors’ intentions. According to sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb (1991), cynicism is the hallmark—and main defect—of the current age. He persuasively argues that cynicism’s roots lie in failed left- and right-wing ideologies—systems of thought that deductively connect “a simple rationalized absolute truth … to a totalized set of political actions and policies” (1991:82). Although most eco-radicals are anything but cynical when they imagine a “green future,” they do take a cynical turn when contemplating the present political order. The dual cynical-ideological mode represents nothing less than the death of liberalism and of reform. Its dangers are eloquently spelled out by Goldfarb (1991:9): “When one thinks ideologically and acts ideologically, opponents become enemies to be vanquished, political compromise becomes a kind of immorality, and constitutional refinements become inconvenient niceties.

This is a fantastic 2NC impact card for a spec. argument (I wouldn’t necessarily read the part about Obama):

No plan allows vague shifting – leads to manipulation and turns their impact
Galles 09 [Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, http://blog.mises.or…or/gary_galles/%5D

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one–including those proposing a “reform”–can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician’s product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face “customers”–voters– far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians’ “sales pitches” for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his “solution” to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)–a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan’s details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying “that was not in our proposal” or “we have no plans to do that” or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don’t spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans’ welfare is the criterion.

TURN-Simulation and roleplaying through fiat encourages learning empowerment–which is better for minorities than cheating by being untopical
Innes and Booher 99
(Judith, Director – Institute of Urban and Regional Development and Professor at UC Berkeley and David, Visiting Scholar at the Institute, Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter, Vol. 65, Iss. 1)
Our observation and practice of consensus building suggests that the analogy to role-playing games will help to illuminate the dynamic of effective consensus processes. Even when the dispute seems intractable, role playing in consensus building allows players to let go of actual or assumed constraints and to develop ideas for creating new conditions and possibilities. Drama and suspension of reality allows competing, even bitterly opposed interests to collaborate, and engages individual players emotionally over many months. Scenario building and storytelling can make collective sense of complexity, of predicting possibilities in an uncertain world, and can allow the playful imagination, which people normally suppress, to go to work. In the course of engaging in various roles, participants develop identities for themselves and others and become more effective participants, representing their stakeholders’ interests more clearly. In many of their most productive moments, participants in consensus building engage not only in playing out scenarios, but also in a kind of collective, speculative tinkering, or bricolage, similar in principle to what game participants do. That is, they play with heterogeneous concepts, strategies, and actions with which various individuals in the group have experience, and try combining them until they create a new scenario that they collectively believe will work. This bricolage, discussed further below, is a type of reasoning and collective creativity fundamentally different from the more familiar types, argumentation and tradeoffs.[sup11] The latter modes of problem solving or dispute resolution typically allow zero sum allocation of resources among participants or finding the actions acceptable to everyone. Bricolage, however, produces, rather than a solution to a known problem, a new way of framing the situation and of developing unanticipated combinations of actions that are qualitatively different from the options on the table at the outset. The result of this collective tinkering with new scenarios is, most importantly, learning and change among the players, and growth in their sophistication about each other, about the issues, and about the futures they could seek. Both consensus building and roleplaying games center on learning, innovation, and change, in a process that is entertaining and-when conducted effectively-in some fundamental sense empowers individuals.

Turn: the fact that we may not become policy makers makes this education more important, not less–and debate simulation & switch side debate is the precondition for solving for movements, social justice, etc.. now and in the future.
Keller, Whittaker, and Burke, 2001. [Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost]
Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key element in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in political or policy oriented practica. In a survey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practica in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/development (BSW=lS%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the largest representation at a single school being 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learning in the classroom: * Students are involved in more than listening. * Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students’ skills * Students are involved in higher-order thinking (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). * Students are engaged in activities. * Greater emphasis is placed on students’ exploration of their own attitudes and values. (p. 2) Experiential learning in the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage students to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situations, and to consider new ways of thinking in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer (Meyers & Jones, 1993).
This is slightly overtagged….but I assume you can explain the core argument.

TURN–Roleplaying good–advocacy of political reform causes familiarity, engagement, and personal reflection — key pedagogical vehicles for change–solving for your case impacts in the real world.
Joyner 99
Christopher C., Professor of International Law – Georgetown U., 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377, June)

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: “Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;” or “Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq’s possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;” or “Resolved: The United States’ invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;” or “Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein.” In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. [*386] By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

I’ve included 3 cards about personal experience. I’m not a fan of the tags.

Roleplaying Good:

TURN–Role playing as the government is key to engaged learning, innovation, and compromise—it’s empirically successful. Roleplaying causes re-thinking of identities and is empirically key to solving for the collective survival of humanity–including minorities.
Esberg and Sagan 12
(Esberg, Jane, BA in International Relations from Stanford and Government Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Sagan, Scott D., Professor of Political Science at Stanford and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, February 17, 2012, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy”, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19 No. 1, Francis & Taylor)FS
These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

Switch Side debate is an important part in reinforcing tolerance- that’s solves their “morality” arguments
Muir 93 Communication studies at George Mason University (Star A., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1993), pp. 277-295, ttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40237780) RaPa
The rôle of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such belief s. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multi valued world, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such “mistaken” values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the “real world” can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.38 Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values tolerance and fairness inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question . . . inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side. . . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one’s own. . . . Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer.39 289 The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are “more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted.”40 While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. … the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race. … If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error.41 At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathy and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-reflective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically, and to “reconstruet alien and opposing belief Systems empathically.”42 Our System of belief s is, by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Rôle playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement to exploration and advocacy, can engender such powerful rôle playing. Redding explains that “debating both sides is a special instance of role-playing,”43 where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a 290 STAR A. MUIR position contrary to their own. This rôle playing, Baird agrees, is an exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths.44 Motivated by the knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion, erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact.45 Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues, is essential for effective critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity A final point about relativism is that switch-side debate encourages fairness and equality of opportunity in evaluating competing values. Initially, it is apparent that a priori fairness is a fundamental aspect of games and gamesmanship.46 Players in the game should start out with equal advantage, and the rules should be construed throughout to provide no undue advantage to one side or the other. Both sides, notes Thompson, should have an equal amount of time and a fair chance to present their arguments. Of critical importance, he insists, is an equality of opportunity.47 Equality of opportunity is manifest throughout many debate procedures and norms. On the question of topicality whether the affirmative plan is an example of the stated topic the issue of “fair ground” for debate is explicitly developed as a criterion for decision. Likewise, when a counterplan is offered against an affirmative plan, the issue of coexistence, or of the “competitiveness” of the plans, frequently turns on the fairness of the affirmative team’s suggested “permutation” of the plans. In these and other issues, the value of fairness, and of equality of opportunity, is highlighted and clarified through constant disputation. The point is simply that debate does teach values, and that these values are instrumental in providing a hearing for alternative points of view. Paying explicit attention to decision criteria, and to the division of ground arguments (a function of competition), effectively renders the value structure pluralisme, rather than relati vistic. In a tolerant context, convictions can stili be formed regarding the appropriateness and utility of differing values. Responding to the charge that switch-side debaters are hypocritical and sophistical, Windes responds with a series of propositions: Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the controversial problem under consideration. . . . This thorough understanding of the problem depends upon careful analysis of the issues and survey of the major arguments and supporting evidence. . . . 291 This measured analysis and examination of the evidence and argument can best be done by the careful testing of each argument pro and con. . . . The learner’s sound conviction covering controversial questions [therefore] depends partly upon his experience in defending and/or rejecting tentative affirmative and negative positions.48 Sound conviction, a key element of an individual’s moral identity, is thus closely linked to a reasoned assessment of both sides. Some have even suggested that it would be immoral not to require debaters to defend both sides of the issues.49 It does seem hypocritical to accept the basic premise of debate, that two opposing accounts are present on everything, and then to allow students the comfort of their own untested convictions. Debate might be rendering students a disservice, insofar as moral education is concerned, if it did not provide them some knowledge of alternative views and the concomitant strength of a reasoned moral conviction.

TURN–Switch-side debate key to lifelong & individuals ability to solve for diversity and inclusion–and thus race and multiculturalism (just last 2 sentences).
O’Donnell 9 (Chair: Timothy O’Donnell, University of Mary Washington, Members: Neil Butt, Wayne State University, Stefan Bauschard, Lakeland School District, New York, Joseph Bellon, Georgia State University, Warren Decker, George Mason University, John Kastulas, Boston College, William Keith, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, James Lyle, Clarion University, Danielle Verney O’Gorman, U.S. Naval Academy, Joseph Packer, University of Pittsburgh, “A Rationale for Intercollegiate Debate in the Twenty-first Century,” 2009, Wake Forest National Debate Conference, PDF) GANGEEZY
Teaching students ethical advocacy has always been mentioned as an important educational benefit of debate (Capp and Capp 1965; Freeley and Steinberg 2005; Hunt 1994; Ulrich 1984; Ziegelmueller, Kay, and Dause 1990). To enforce ethical conduct by participants, guidelines have been promulgated by governing bodies of debate, including the American Forensic Association, the American Debate Association, the Cross Examination Debate Association, and the National Debate Tournament Committee. Rules prohibiting the misuse and fabrication of evidence, rules establishing the eligibility of debaters, and rules prohibiting sexual harassment by students and judges have been adopted. Through their participation in debate, students learn the importance of conforming to these standards as well as the benefits of participating in a scholarly community characterized by academic integrity. Coaches teach students how to avoid plagiarism and to cite evidence properly. They are also taught never to cite evidence out of context. Students participating in debate receive constant reinforcement from their coaches, from judges, and from other student competitors, stressing the ethical requirement to obey these communal norms. As a result, the misuse, distortion, and fabrication of evidence are extremely rare in academic debate. At the same time, concerns that debate advocacy is unethical because it emphasizes competitive success over educational learning have been expressed over the years. Some have feared that the emphasis on winning will produce sophists who are devoid of ethical responsibility (Gow 1967; Haiman 1964; Horn and Underberg 1991). If this were the case, students might be more likely to distort the truth and be encouraged to lie. If true, this would be a damning indictment of the activity of debate. Fortunately, this perspective has been totally discredited by empirical research (Rogers 2002, 2005). In fact, research demonstrates that debaters are less likely than nondebaters to distort the truth and ignore conflicting evidence of contrary viewpoints. Moreover, debaters are less likely to engage in situational ethics, that is, to conveniently shift their ethical position depending on the circumstances (Rogers 2002, 2005). There is a far stronger case to be made that participation in switch-side debating teaches students to form a sound ethical foundation. For example, Star Muir argues that “firm moral commitments to a value system” are “founded in reflexive assessments of multiple perspectives” (1993, 291). By forcing students to defend both sides of an argument, switch-side debating cultivates a “healthy ethic of tolerance and pluralism” and leads students to appreciate the validity of opposing belief systems, while “instilling responsible and critical skepticism toward dominant systems” (Harrigan 2008, 37). This process of debate and self-reflection over time produces a more ethical belief system because it is grounded in critical thought. Nurturing debate about alternative viewpoints and trying on others’ ideas through simulated and situational argument is the essence of a free society and the basis for an ethical society.

Education Impacts
Policy Debate/Switch Side Debate

Decision making skills are necessary to solve existential threats—now is uniquely key because of increasing complexity and lack of information literacy
Lundberg 10
(Lundberg, Christian O., professor of communications at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “ The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina”, Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century)FS
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry’s capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988, 63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modern articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid.). Larkin’s study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so. . . . These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate]. . . . These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students’ self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing . . . the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin’s study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack’s (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack’s framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today’s student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, research and information-processing skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

Making debate a site for activism encourages dangerous elite infiltration and politicizes debate’s training process
Coverstone, 95 – masters in communication from Wake Forest and longtime debate coach
(Alan, “An Inward Glance; A Response to Mitchell’s Outward Activist Turn,” http://groups.wfu.ed…ne1995China.htm)
Second, Mitchell’s argument underestimates the risks associated with an outward turn. Individuals trained in the art and practice of debate are, indeed, well suited to the task of entering the political world. At some unspecified point in one’s training, the same motivation and focus that has consumed Mitchell will also consume most of us. At that point, political action becomes a proper endeavor. However, all of the members of the academic debate community will not reach that point together. A political outward turn threatens to corrupt the oasis in two ways. It makes our oasis a target, and it threatens to politicize the training process. As long as debate appears to be focused inwardly, political elites will not feel threatened. Yet one of Mitchell’s primary concerns is recognition of our oasis in the political world. In this world we face well trained information managers. Sensing a threat from “debate,” they will begin to infiltrate our space. Ready made information will increase and debaters will eat it up. Not yet able to truly discern the relative values of information, young debaters will eventually be influenced dramatically by the infiltration of political elites. Retaining our present anonymity in political life offers a better hope for reinvigorating political discourse. As perhaps the only truly non-partisan space in American political society, academic debate holds the last real possibility for training active political participants. Nowhere else are people allowed, let alone encouraged, to test all manner of political ideas. This is the process through which debaters learn what they believe and why they believe it. In many ways this natural evolution is made possible by the isolation of the debate community. An example should help illustrate this idea. Like many young debaters, I learned a great deal about socialism early on. This was not crammed down my throat. Rather, I learned about the issue in the free flow of information that is debate. The intrigue of this, and other outmoded political arguments, was in its relative unfamiliarity. Reading socialist literature avidly, I was ready to take on the world. Yet I only had one side of the story. I was an easy mark for the present political powers. Nevertheless, I decided to fight City Hall. I had received a parking ticket which I felt was unfairly issued. Unable to convince the parking department to see it my way, I went straight to the top. I wrote the Mayor a letter. In this letter, I accused the city of exploitation of its citizens for the purpose of capital accumulation. I presented a strong Marxist critique of parking meters in my town. The mayor’s reply was simple and straightforward. He called me a communist. He said I was being silly and should pay the ticket. I was completely embarrassed by the entire exchange. I thought I was ready to start the revolution. In reality, I wasn’t even ready to speak to the Mayor. I did learn from the experience, but I did not learn what Gordon might have hoped. I learned to stop reading useless material and to keep my opinions to myself. Do we really want to force students into that type of situation? I wrote the mayor on my own. Debaters will experiment with political activism on their own. This is all part of the natural impulse for activism which debate inspires. Yet, in the absence of such individual motivation, an outward turn threatens to short circuit the learning process. Debate should capitalize on its isolation. We can teach our students to examine all sides of an issue and reach individual conclusions before we force them into political exchanges. To prematurely turn debaters out threatens to undo the positive potential of involvement in debate.

Competition within debates alters the focus from focusing on a communal problem to winning
Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)
Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes mat each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

Attempting to create change within a debate round generate backlash
Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)
If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try me method of public argument that we reach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people. The “debate as innovation” perspective views each debate in a vacuum with little to no consequences on any other community. The “debate as activism” perspective views each debate as a site of resistance where the debate community can confront problems in an effort to change. Both extremes replicate the education versus competition tension that has been a part of the debate community ever since the move away from the literary societies. In the final section of this chapter, we outline a potential solution to the divergent perspectives that is based on tournament experimentation. Our goal is to outline a blueprint for a community dialogue that could be replicated week in and week out at regional and national tournaments throughout the country.

1NC- personal experience
Requiring personal experience in debate reinforces power structures and normalizes oppression
Tonn ’5
(Tonn, Mari Boor, Professor of Communications at the University of Maryland, Fall 2005, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)FS
This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102

A point of stasis [or plan focus] in a competitive format is essential to address structural problems— personal focus causes complacency
Tonn ’5
(Tonn, Mari Boor, Professor of Communications at the University of Maryland, Fall 2005, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)FS
Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, “Conversation has no end outside itself.”39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet “talking cures” can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell’s analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women’s liberation movement points out, “[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction.”40
Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the “self-help” on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to “heal” themselves.
Below, various exemplars of public interactions and decision-making processes couched as “conversations” and “dialogues” expose the promotion of these private communication models as balm for the inequities, discord, and inertia of civic life as often more romantic than realistic, what Burke might term an “idealistic lie.”41 As importantly, such cases illustrate his contention that ostensible “cures” for social problems often “take on the quality of the disease.” 42 Indeed, rather than remedying exclusion, hierarchy, polarization, and inertia in civic life, the appropriation of conversation and dialogue into the public realm can foster and sustain such problems.

-personal experience ext.

Conversations about personal experience reinforce hierarchies while causing complacency
Tonn ’5
(Tonn, Mari Boor, Professor of Communications at the University of Maryland, Fall 2005, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)FS
In certain ways, Schudson’s initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational advocates champion. Still, in the spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues that various negative consequences can result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson’s critique of a conversational model for democracy in two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a variety of venues, illustrating how public “conversation” and “dialogue” have been coopted to silence rather than empower marginalized or dissenting voices. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed “the tyranny of structurelessness” in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness raising groups in the women’s liberation movement,15 as well as the key traits Irving L. Janis ascribes to “groupthink.”16 Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public sphere, public conversation can and has accomplished the reverse. When such moves are rendered transparent, public conversation and dialogue, I contend, risk increasing rather than diminishing political cynicism and alienation. Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual’s voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.17 First, because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although “nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren’t very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of ‘just talking.’”18 Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of “healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment” tends to “encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration.”19

-empiricism best

Facts key to minorities and solving racism (Prefer empiricism – it is the best method for addressing racism)
Allport 54 After earning his A.B. degree in Philosophy and Economics from Harvard in 1919, Allport traveled to Istanbul, Turkey to teach philosophy and economics. After a year of teaching, he returned to Harvard to finish his studies. Allport earned his Ph.D. in Psychology at Harvard in 1922 under the guidance of Hugo Munsterberg. (G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice. Evaluation of Practices Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley) RaPa
But, we must ask, may not scientific and factual instruction contain information unfavorable to minority groups? Yes, it is conceivable that the incidence of evil traits may be higher in one group than in another (Chapters 6, 7, 9). If so, this information should not be suppressed. If we are going after the truth we must go after the whole of it-not merely after the part that is congenial. Enlightened members of minority groups favor the publication of all scientific and factual findings, for they are convinced that when the whole truth is known it will show that most of the common stereotypes and accusations are false. If a small percentage of the accusations prove to be justified, the proper explanations of the findings in terms of adverse condition under which many minority groups live will improve perspective on the problem and motivate reform. For example, the fact that some members of persecuted groups may sometimes develop defenses is a fact not to be suppressed but to be faced and sympathetically understood. How shall we sum up? Mere information, we concede, does not necessarily alter either attitude or action. What is more, its gains, according to available research, seem slighter than those of other educational methods employed. At the same time, there is virtually no evidence that sound factual information does any harm. Perhaps its value may be long delayed, and may consist in driving wedges of doubt and discomfort into the stereotype of the prejudiced. It seems likely, too, that the greater gain ascribed to other educational (e.g., project) methods require sound factual instruction as underpinning. All in all, we do well to resist the irrational position that invites us to abandon entirely the traditional ideals and methods of formal education. Facts may not be enough, but they[u] still may be indispensable.

USfg action is and should be an important consideration for all movements – only SSD solves this.
Harrigan 8 NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wf…arrigancd052008, p. 57-59)RaPa

With a shallow understanding of SSD, it may appear that debate has a pro-institutional and anti-radical agenda that seeks to channel dissent through avenues familiar to elites; a lens of privilege that sustains the status quo. Yet, the arguments of this defense of SSD indicate that such discomfort may be justified—if not necessary—to fulfill the epistemic, moral, and political objectives of debate. The process of SSD mandates an acceptance of the idea that all currently held ideas are not correct and that, over time, some will come to be replaced by others. This may be momentarily upsetting, but the social good is clearly served by such a process. Morally, the acceptance of tolerance and empathy requires the willingness to set outside of our own egocentric beliefs and stand in the position of the other. It does not necessarily require rejecting our own beliefs. Instead, debaters are asked to be willing to consider a position from multiple simultaneous points of view. Finally, while debaters are required to argue on behalf of state politics, in the long-run the training, skills, and knowledge that they receive from doing so will make them much more effective advocates of the anti-bureaucratic cause. Given all of this, while the anti-SSD view is understandable based on the short-term sacrifices that it may require, it alone does not warrant a reversion to a process of debating from conviction.

Switch Side debate focused on government action fosters advocacy skills – that’s a prerequisite for activism
Harrigan 8 NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wf…arrigancd052008, p. 57-59)RaPa
Frequently, for strategies for change, the devil lies in the details. It is not possible to simply click one’s ruby red slippers together and wish for alternatives to come into being. Lacking a plausible mechanism to enact reforms, many have criticized critical theory as being a “fatally flawed enterprise” (Jones 1999). For activists, learning the skills to successfully negotiate hazardous political terrain is crucial. They must know when to and when not to compromise, negotiate, and strike political alliances in order to be successful. The pure number of failed movements in the past several decades demonstrates the severity of the risk assumed by groups who do not focus on refining their preferred means of change. Given the importance of strategies for change, SSD is even more crucial. Debaters trained by debating both sides are substantially more likely to be effective advocates than those experienced only in arguing on behalf of their own convictions. For several reasons, SSD instills a series of practices that are essential for a successful activist agenda. First, SSD creates more knowledgeable advocates for public policy issues. As part of the process of learning to argue both sides, debaters are forced to understand the intricacies of multiple sides of the argument considered. Debaters must not only know how to research and speak on behalf of their own personal convictions, but also for the opposite side in order to defend against attacks of that position. Thus, when placed in the position of being required to publicly defend an argument, students trained via SSD are more likely to be able to present and persuasively defend their positions. Second, learning the nuances of all sides of a position greatly strengthens the resulting convictions of debaters, their ability to anticipate opposing arguments, and the effectiveness of their attempts to locate the crux, nexus and loci of arguments. As is noted earlier, conviction is a result, not a prerequisite of debate. Switching sides and experimenting with possible arguments for and against controversial issues, in the end, makes students more likely to ground their beliefs in a reasoned form of critical thinking that is durable and unsusceptible to knee-jerk criticisms. As a result, even though it may appear to be inconsistent with advocacy, SSD “actually created stronger advocates” that are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals (Dybvig and Iverson 2000).

Switch side prevents fundamentalism and scape-goating—our framework is key to foster inclusion. Key to solving long term exclusion, racism, otherization, dogmatism, and violence.
Harrigan 8 NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wf…arrigancd052008, p. 57-59)RaPa
Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, 44 even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It [pluralism] implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective Truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history 45 has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society

–decision making o/w edu.
Real world decision-making skills outweigh any educational benefits
Strait and Wallace 7
(Strait, L. Paul, George Mason University and Wallace, Brett, George Washington University, “The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making”, Policy Cures? Health Assistance to Africa, Debaters Research Guide)FS
More to the point, debate certainly helps teach a lot of skills, yet we believe that the way policy debate participation encourages you to think is the most valuable educational benefit, because how someone makes decisions determines how they will employ the rest of their abilities, including the research and communication skills that debate builds. Plenty of debate theory articles have explained either the value of debate, or the way in which alternate actor strategies are detrimental to real-world education, but none so far have attempted to tie these concepts together. We will now explain how decision-making skill development is the foremost value of policy debate and how this benefit is the decision-rule to resolving all theoretical discussions about negative fiat. Why debate? Some do it for scholarships, some do it for social purposes, and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to join the debate team, but as debate theorists they aren’t the focus of our concern. Our concern is finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of skills, while at the same time preserving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the one thing every single one of us will do every day of our lives besides breathing. Decision-making transcends boundaries between categories of learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,” it makes irrelevant considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers, and it transcends questions of what substantive content a debate round should contain. The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can best improve all of our lives. While policy comparison skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those skills are useless if they are not grounded in the kind of logic actually used to make decisions. The academic studies and research supporting this position are numerous. Richard Fulkerson (1996) explains that “argumentation…is the chief cognitive activity by which a democracy, a field of study, a corporation, or a committee functions. . . And it is vitally important that high school and college students learn both to argue well and to critique the arguments of others” (p. 16). Stuart Yeh (1998) comes to the conclusion that debate allows even cultural minority students to “identify an issue, consider different views, form and defend a viewpoint, and consider and respond to counterarguments…The ability to write effective arguments influences grades, academic success, and preparation for college and employment” (p. 49).Certainly, these are all reasons why debate and argumentation themselves are valuable, so why is real world decision-making critical to argumentative thinking? Although people might occasionally think about problems from the position of an ideal decisionmaker (c.f. Ulrich, 1981, quoted in Korcok, 2001), in debate we should be concerned with what type of argumentative thinking is the most relevant to real-world intelligence and the decisions that people make every day in their lives, not academic trivialities. It is precisely because it is rooted inreal-world logic that argumentative thinking has value. Deanna Kuhn’s research in “Thinking as Argument” explains this by stating that “no other kind of thinking matters more-or contributes more to the quality and fulfillment of people’s lives, both individually and collectively” (p. 156).

You might also check “performance” and “framework” and similar searches at the3nr.
For instance here’s a link to their K section: http://www.the3nr.com/category/instruction-and-commentary/kritiks/

There are a number of these debates you can watch:
1) I saw a decent Capitalism K versus race, which was pretty good. (this is on Debate Vision)
2) Straight turns on race projects you can watch (this is a Kansas debate)
You might also consider looking at the work on White Guilt from Bruckner.

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One Comment

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  1. compassioninpolitics / Jan 8 2013 4:54 pm

    Pointer has 2 lectures on framework (scan almost to the very bottom):
    http://mygdi.net/lecture-notes/

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